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THE UNIFORM SALES ACT IN THE STATE
OF WASHINGTON.$
PART IV
RIGHTS OF UNPAMD SELLER AGAINST THE GOODS.
See. 52. Definitson of Unpasd Seller
(1) The seller of goods is deemed to be an unpaid seller within the
meaning of this act; (a) When the whole of the price has not been paid
or tendered. (b) When a bill of exchange or other negotiable instrument
has been received as conditional payment, and the condition on which it
was received has been broken by reason of dishonor of the instrument,
the insolvency of the buyer or otherwise.
(2) In this part of this act the term "seller" includes an agent of the
seller to whom the bill of lading has been indorsed, or a consignor or
agent who has himself paid, or is directly responsible for, the price, or
any other person who is in the position of a seller.
It should be noted under subsection (1) that the seller is not
treated as unpaid if tender has been made. Obviously, if he is in
default he should not be entitled to the special remedies provided.
(a) is in accord with the common law"' (b) is also in accord
with the law in this state. 55
In the case of Thomas v. Coast Carton Co., where trade ac-
ceptances had been given in payment of cartons and the buyer
subsequently became bankrupt, Justice Fullerton states
"No doubt that such (a recovery by the trustee in bank-
ruptcy) would be the necessary result had the acceptances
been paid, and it may be that such would be the necessary
result had they been negotiated and were outstanding in
the hands of third persons as present obligations of the
foods company But such is not the situation, the trade
acceptances were not paid, nor are they outstanding as
obligations of the foods company In so far as the rela-
tion of the parties to the acceptances is concerned, the
situation is as it would be had there been a breach of the
contract to deliver them."
The Court thereupon held that the trustee being in no better
position than the bankrupt was not entitled to possession without
payment or tender of the purchase price. It may be suggested
that even had the acceptances been negotiated the trustee would
"I, Thomas v. Coast Carton Co., 143 Wash. 660, 255 Pac. 1041 (1927)
' Note 154, supra.
' Note 154, supra.
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have been in no better position, as the seller should be protected
upon Is indorsement. Such has been the line of authorities.
1 57
Subsection (2) merely includes anyone who is in a position
similar to the seller and needs similar protection. This subsection
follows the general law.
Section 53. Remedies of an Unpasd Seller
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, notwithstanding that the
property in the goods may have passed to the buyer, the unpaid seller
of goods, as such, has: (a) A lien on the goods or right to retain them
for the price while he is in possession of them. (b) In case of the
insolvency of the buyer, a right of stopping the goods in transitu after
he has parted with the possession of them. (c) A right of resale as
limited by this act. (d) A right to rescind the sale as limited by this act.
(2) Where the property in goods has not passed to the buyer, the
unpaid seller has, in addition to his other remedies, a right of withholding
delivery similar to and coextensive with his rights of lien and stoppage
In transitu where the property has passed to the buyer.
The various subdivisions of subsection (1) are generally recog-
azed rules of the common law existing in the United States. These
various subdivisions are set out m full and will be discussed here-
inafter under sections 54 to 62 of this act. (a) and (b) should,
of course, be read in connection with (c) and (d).
Subsection (2) would seem clearly to follow. The seller's reme-
dies should certainly not be less so far at least as the goods are
concerned when he has not proceeded so far in the transaction as
to pass title.
UN-PAi SELLER'S LiEN
See. 54. When Right of Lzen May Be Exercised.
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, the unpaid seller of goods
who is in possession of them is entitled to retain possession of them
until payment or tender of the price in the following cases, namely,
(a) Where the goods have been sold without any stipulation as to credit.
(b) Where the goods have been sold on credit, but the term of credit has
expired. (c) Where the buyer becomes insolvent.
(2) The seller may exercise his right of lien notwithstanding that he
is in possession of the goods as agent or bailee for the buyer.
This section follows section 41 of the English Sale of Goods
Act, and expresses well-established rules of the common law.' 8
2MCClee v. Metropolitan Lbr. Go., 69 Fed. 302, 16 C. C. A. 232 (1895)
and cases cited in 2 WM.sTON, SALEs, 1309, note 7.
11Hosner v. McDonnell, 114 Wash. 489, 195 Pac. 231 (1921) Thomas
v. Coast Cartom Co., note 154, supra, and the various cases cited herein-
after under the treatment of the subjects of resale and rescission.
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As to subsection (2), it may be noted that this is always the
situation where the seller's lien is in question. It is, of course,
qualified by the other provisions.
Sec. 55. Lsen After Part Delivery.
Where an unpaid seller has made part delivery of the goods, he may
exercise his right of lien on the remainder unless such part delivery has
been made under such circumstances as to show an intent to waive the
lien or right of retention.
This section follows the English Sale of Goods Act and ex-
presses the rule of the common law.'5 9 Cases of delivery to sub-
purchasers should be distinguished. 60
Section 56. When Lzen Is Lost.
(1) The unpaid seller of goods loses his lien thereon: (a) When he
delivers the goods to a carrier or other bailee for the purpose of trans-
mission to the buyer without reserving the property in the goods or the
right to the possession thereof. (b) When the buyer or his agent lawfully
obtains possession of the goods. (c) By waiver thereof.
(2) The unpaid seller of goods, having a lien thereon, does not lose his
lien by reason only that he has obtained judgment or decree for the price
of the goods.
Subsection (1) follows the English Act substantially and un-
doubtedly represents the common law of the United States. (a)
is qualified by section 57, snfra, which should in turn be read with
section 62. (b) There are two Washington cases in accord.'"-
Even though the goods are delivered to the buyer an agreement
may be made that the seller shall retain a lien.'6 ' (c) The seller
waives his lien not only by expressly doing so but by conduct in-
consistent with its retention. This is a question of fact, but should
not be waived unless clearly inconsistent.
Subsection (2) is in accord with the authorities and seems de-
sirable in that such action is not necessarily inconsistent with
the lien.
STOPPAGE I N TRANSITU.
Subsection 57 Seller May Stop Goods on Buyer's Insolvency.
Subject to the provisions of this act, when the buyer of goods is or
becomes insolvent, the unpaid seller who has parted with the possession
of the goods has the right of stopping them in transitu; that is to say,
' Thomas v. Coast Carton Co., note 154, supra.
'-o See section 62, snfra.
"'Esmond v. Richards, 112 Wash. 641, 192 Pac. 917 (1920) Hosner v.
McDonnell, note 158, supra.
112Horr v. Powe, 18 Wash. 536, 52 Pac. 235 (1898).
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he may resume possession of the goods at anytime while they are in
transit, and he will then become entitled to the same rights in regard to
the goods as he would have had if he had never parted with the posses-
sion.
Tns section states the generally recognized right of stoppage
in transitu. It is definitely recognized in the State of Washing-
ton. 63 As to when a person is insolvent, see Section 76 (3), tins
Act, enfra.
See. 58. When Goods Are in Transit.
(1) Goods are in transit within the meaning of Section 57" (a) From the
time when they are delivered to a carrier by land or water, or other ballee
for the purpose of transmission to the buyer, until the buyer, or his agent
in that behalf, takes delivery of them from such carrier or other ballee;
(b) If the goods are rejected by the buyer, and the carrier or other ballee
continues In possession of them, even if the seller has refused to receive
them back.
(2) Goods are no longer in transit within the meaning of Section 57"
(a) If the buyer, or his agent in that behalf, obtains delivery of the goods
before their arrival at the appointed destination; (b) If, after the arrival
of the goods at the appointed destination, the carrier or other bailee
acknowledges to the buyer or his agent that he holds the goods on his
behalf and continues in possession of them as bailee for the buyer or his
agent; and It is immaterial that a further destination for the goods may
have been indicated by the buyer; (c) If the carrier or other ballee wrong-
fully refuses to deliver the goods to the buyer or his agent in that behalf.
(3) If the goods are delivered to a ship chartered by the buyer, it is a
question depending on the circumstances of the particular case whether
they are In the possession of the master as a carrier or as agent of the
buyer.
(4) If part delivery of the goods has been made to the buyer, or his
agent in that behalf, the remainder of the goods may be stopped in
transitu, unless such part delivery has been made under such circum-
stances as to show an agreement with the buyer to give up possession of
the whole of the goods.
This section was intended to reproduce accurately the common
law.16 4 It may be noted particularly that subsection 1 (a) pro-
vides that the goods are in transit regardless of the nature of the
general business of the bailee if they are in the bailee's hands for
the purpose of transmission to the buyer; that subsection (2) (a)
must obviously follow when it is recognixed that the carriage is
for the benefit of the buyer; and that the subsections generally
are in accord with the provisions for the vendor's lien, of which,
113Ktox v. Fuller, 23 Wash. 34, 62 Pac. 131 (1900).
'" 1 WIELIsToN, ZAI.Es, 523 et seq.
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in fact, the doctrine of stoppage in transitu is merely an extension
under the given circumstances. The termination of the transit
by reason of the attornment of the bailee to the buyer is well
illustrated in a Washington case." 5
Sec. 59. Ways of Exercising the Right to Stop.
(1) The unpaid seller may exercise his right of stoppage In transitu
either by obtaining actual possession of the goods or by giving notice of
his claim to the carrier or other bailee in whose possession the goods
are. Such notice may be given either to the person in actual possession
of the goods or to his principal. In the latter case the notice, to be
effectual, must be given at such time and under such circumstances that
the principal, by the exercise of reasonable diligence, may prevent a
delivery to the buyer.
(2) When notice of stoppage in transitu is given by the seller to the
carrier, or other bailee in possession of the goods, he must redeliver the
goods to, or according to the directions of, the seller. The expense of
such delivery must be borne by the seller. If, however, a negotiable
document of title representing the goods has been issued by the carrier
or other bailee, he shall not be obliged to deliver or be justified in deliv-
ering the goods to the seller unless such document is first surrendered
for cancellation.
Subsection (1) is sound from a business standpoint and prob-
ably expresses the prior law The last part of subsection (2)
does not express the English law The carrier should be liable to
a bona fide transferee of its bill of lading, and unquestionably
would be at common law if the transferee took for value before
the stoppage. It would be seen from section 62, snfra, that even
though the transferee took after the notice of stoppage, he is
protected. The carrier, therefore, ought not to be obliged or
allowed to surrender the goods unless the document of title is sur-
rendered.
RESALE BY THE SELLER.
Sec. 60. When and How Resale May Be Made.
(1) Where the goods are of a perishable nature, or where the seller
expressly reserves the right of resale in case the buyer should make
default, or where the buyer has been in default in the payment of the
price an unreasonable time, an unpaid seller having a right of lien or
having stopped the goods in transitu may resell the goods. He shall not
thereafter be liable to the original buyer upon the contract to sell or the
sale or for any profit made by such resale but may recover from the
"I Knox v. Fuller note 163, supra.
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buyer damages for any loss occasioned by the breach of the contract or
the sale.
(2) Where a 4resale is made, as authorized in this section, the buyer
acquires a good title as against the original buyer.
(3) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that notice of an inten-
tion to resell the goods be given by the seller to the original buyer. But
where the right to resell is not based on the perishable nature of the
goods or upon an express provision of the contract or the sale, the giving
or failure to give such notice shall be revelant in any issue involving the
question whether the buyer had been in default an unreasonable time
before the resale was made.
(4) It is not essential to the validity of a resale that notice of the time
and place of such resale should be given by the seller to the original
buyer.
(5) The seller is bound to exercise reasonable care and judgment in
making a resale, and subject to this requirement may make a resale either
by public or private sale.
Bearing in mind that this section comes under the classification
of the "Rights of unpaid seller against the goods" and merely
contemplates the right of the seller to enforce his lien, it seems
obvious that tins right should be recognized, and this is generally
the law. It was recognized without question in Carver-Shadbolt
Co. v. Klesn. 16
It is apparent that upon the substantial default of the buyer
where title has passed, that the seller is confronted with a choice
of several remedies. The title having passed and he still being
in possession, he has his lien and may enforce the same by a resale
as provided in this section, he may, however, under section 61,
snfra, revest title in hinself and recover damages as though title
had never passed, and, he may, as provided in section 63, nfra,
maintain his action on the contract for the contract price. The
question may, therefore, well arise as to whether the seller is not
bound to make an election within a reasonable time, particularly
as his election will usually mitigate the damages of the buyer, for
it is apparent that if the buyer will not or can not take the goods
they will ordinarily deteriorate in value. To be safe, the seller
should make such an election.167  In the similar situation where
the seller has an election, the title not having passed, our court
has had no hesitation in holding that after a reasonable time the
seller has elected to rescind in the absence of other expression. 68
1- 69 Wash. 586, 125 Pac. 944 (1912).
"' 1 WuILISTON, SALES, 559.
'I' See cases cited under subsection (3), section 63, snfra.
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These cases may possibly be distinguished on the basis that the
election there allowed for resale is for the purpose of ascertaining
the market price.
It should be noted under subsection (1) that the seller may
retain any profit made by such resale. There should be no objec-
tion to this, as he has the election to rescind the entire contract
of sale under section 65, infra, and it would seem the resale itself
night under such circumstances be treated as an act showing his
intention to thus rescind.
Subsection (2) necessarily follows, for the very right of resale
contemplates the buyer's capacity to pass title.
Subsection (3) determines a point upon which there has been
considerable conflict. In the case of Carver-Shadbolt Co. v.
Klein,69 notice was in fact given. Assuming that notice is of im-
portance, it would seem that it is so only for the purpose of
insuring a fair sale and, therefore, should not be the determing
factor as to the validity of such a sale. It is to the seller's advan-
tage and good business practice should require such a notice. The
last sentence applies to subsection (4) as well.
Subsection (5) states the general rule.
REcISSION BY THE SELLER.
Sec. 61. When and How the Seller May Rescind the Sale.
(1) An unpaid seller having the right of lien or having stopped the
goods in transitu, may rescind the transfer of title and resume the prop-
erty in the goods, where he expressly reserved the right to do so in case
the buyer should make default; or where the buyer has been in default
in the payment of the price an unreasonable time. The seller shall not
thereafter be liable to the buyer upon the contract to sell or the sale, but
may recover from the buyer damages for any loss occasioned by the
breach of the contract or the sale.
(2) The transfer of title shall not be held to have been rescinded by
an unpaid seller until he has manifested by notice to the buyer or by
some other overt act an Intention to rescind. It is not necessary that
such overt act should be communicated to the buyer, but the giving or
failure to give notice to the buyer of the intention to rescind shall be
relevant in any issue involving the question whether the buyer had been
in default an unreasonable time before the right of rescission was
asserted.
This section is not contained in the English Sale of Goods Act,
and the remedy for which the section provides is not allowed by
English law. It is- allowed in this country, and seems fully jus-
16 Note 166, supra.
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tified by mercantile custom and convemence. It is to be noted
that notice or some overt act is necessary in the case of recission
of the sale, for until election is manifested the title is presumably
still in the buyer.
See. 62. Effect of Sale of Goods Subject to Lzen or Stoppage in.
Transitu.
Subject to the provisions of this act, the unpaid seller's right of lien or
stoppage in transitu is not affected by any sale, or other disposition of
the goods whicli the buyer may have made, unless the seller has assented
thereto.
If, however, a negotiable document of title has been issued for goods,
no seller's lien or right of stoppage in transitu shall defeat the right of
any purchaser for value in good faith to whom such document has been
negotiated, whether such negotiation be prior or subsequent to the noti-
fication to the carrier, or other bailee who issued such document, of the
seller's claim to a lien or right of stoppage in transitu.
The first part of this section states the well-established law. The
second part of the section gives full effect to the mercantile theory
of the full negotiability of the bill of lading. As between the
right of stoppage in transitu and the negotiability of a bill of
lading it seems better to limit the former, as the seller has entrusted
the buyer with a perfect apparent title.
PART V
ACTION FOR BREACH OF THE CONTRACT-REMEDES OF THE SELLE.
See. 63. Actwn for the Price.
(1) Where, under a contract to sell, or a sale, the property in the
goods has passed to the buyer, and the buyer wrongfully neglects or
refuses to pay for the goods, according to the terms of the contract or
the sale, the seller may maintain an action against him for the price
of the goods.
(2) Where, under a contract to sell or a sale, the price Is payable on
a day certain, irrespective of delivery or of transfer of title, and the
buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to pay such price, the seller may
maintain an action for the price, although the property in the goods has
not passed, and the goods have not been appropriated to the contract.
But it shall be a defense to such an action that the seller at any time
before judgment in such action has manifested an inability to perform
the. contract or the sale on his part or an intention not to perform it.
(3) Although the property in the goods has not passed, if they can not
readily be resold for a reasonable price, and if the provisions of Section
64 (4) are not applicable, the seller may offer to deliver the goods to the
buyer, and, If the buyer refuses to receive them, may notify the buyer
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that the goods are thereafter held by the seller as bailee for the buyer.
Thereafter the seller may treat the goods as the buyer's and may main-
tain an action for the price.
Subsection (1) is obvious.
Subsection (2) states a well-recognized principle in the law of
contracts. The usual rule is that payment of price and delivery of
the goods are concurrent acts, and even though a date be fixed for
performance on one side only, the court will indulge in this pre-
sumption unless clearly shown that the performances are inde-
pendent.
Subsection (3) is not the English law The English courts hold
logically that the seller still being the holder of the goods he ought
not also to be given the price for them. He is therefore limited
to a recovery in damages measured by the difference in value be-
tween what he has and what he would have secured had the con-
tract been performed. In the United States, on the other hand,
the weight of authority permits the recovery of the purchase price,
and goes even further than the rule announced in the subsection.
To this effect see McNeff v. Captstran,"0 where the court says at
page 505
"In the early case of Dunstan v. McAndrew, 44 N. Y
72, it was held that a vendor in an executory contract for
the sale of personal property where the vendee refuses
to take or pay for the property, has a choice of remedies,
first, he may store or retain the property for the use of
the vendee and recover the entire contract price, second,
he may sell the property, acting as agent of the vendee
for the purpose, and recover the difference between the
contract price and the price obtained upon the resale,
or, third, he may keep the property as his own and re-
cover the difference between the market price of the prop-
erty at the time and place of delivery and the contract
price. The case has been cited many times since its an-
nouncement, and it is possible that the rule laid down is
the rule in the majority of jurisdictions."
This election has been stated in several Washington cases.
17 1
It may be interesting to note that the foregoing rule from Dun-
stan v. McAndrew"72 is usually cited and used indiscriminately
whether title has or has not passed, and occasionally leads to some
170120 Wash. 498, 208 Pac. 41 (1922).
1uHess v. Seitzick, 95 Wash. 393, 396, 163 Pac. 941 (1917) Fosseen d
Co. v. Kennewick Sup. & Stor Co., 144 Wash. 67, 69, 256 Pac. 799 (1927)
Schott Go. v. Stone, Fisher & Lane, 35 Wash. 252, 259, 77 Pac. 192 (1904).
"144 N. Y. 72.
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confusion.1 3 When applied in cases where the title has not passed,
it obviously has the effect of giving specific performance, and this
is true without regard to the nature of the goods, that is, whether
they are ordinary or exceptional-with or without market value.
Even this extreme application meets the prime requirement of
mercantile convenience, vz., certainty
The Sales Act, as expressed in tis subsection, has taken the
middle ground betweeen the English and the New York views, and
one that is consistent with equitable relief. It permits the recovery
of the purchase price where the goods can not readily be resold
for a reasonable price, incidentally requiring the seller to notify
the buyer that the goods are held by the seller as bailee for the
buyer. This will have the effect of cutting down the rule in its
broader application, where it was applied apparently regardless
of the nature of the goods.174 The case of Hatchard v. Raymond
Veneer Co.,y7 denying the vendor a verdict for the contract price
does not militate against this remedy, as it was there held the
seller had made is election by bringing his suit for the recovery
of damages.
The cases in Washington seem primarily to have been concerned
with the question of the right of the vendor to make a resale and
bring suit against the buyer for the difference between the resale
price and the contract price. If the resale was made within a rea-
sonable time the vendor was allowed this remedy, but if not made
within a reasonable time the courts construed the vendor's delay
to be an election to rescind and thereupon limited the vendor to
his action for damages. This is probably because the resale is
treated as being for the purpose of ascertaining the market
price.17 6
To summarize, the effect of this subsection will be to limit the
rule of Dunstan v. McAndrew, supra, to those cases where goods
cannot readily be resold for a reasonable price, and requires notice
to the buyer of such election and that they will be held by the
273 See Section 60, supra.
117 See Dooley & Co. v. Seattle Electrc Supply Go., 122 Wash. 354, 210
Pac. 668 (1922).
'1127 Wash. 443, 210 Pac. 668 (1923).
11 Hess v. Seitztec, note 171, supra, Fosseen & Co. v. Kennewtck, etc.
Co., note 171, supra, Hartman Pac. Co. v. Estee, 127 Wash. 151, 219 Pac.
867 (1923) Metzler v. Balcom, 135 Wash. 318, 237 Pac. 716 (1925). It
would seem that the right of resale will not be affected by this act if
used for the purpose of ascertaining the market price. See cases cited
under subsection (3), section 64, Uniform Laws Annotated-Sales Act and
Supplement.
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seller thereafter as bailee for the buyer. And, it should be noted
that this is further restricted by the provision of subsection (4)
of section 64, snfra.
Section 64. Actwn for Damages for Non-Acceptance of the
Goods.
(1) Where the buyer wrongfully neglects or refuses to accept and pay
for the goods, the seller may maintain an action against him for damages
for non-acceptance.
(2) The measure of damages is the estimated loss directly and natur-
ally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the buyer's breach
of contract.
(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the
measure of damages is, in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damage of a greater amount, the difference between the con-
tract price and the market or current price at the time or times when
the goods ought to have been accepted, or, if no time was fixed for accept-
ance, then at the time of the refusal to accept.
(4) If while labor or expense of material amount are necessary on the
part of the seller to enable him to fulfill his obligations under the con-
tract to sell or the sale, the buyer repudiates the contract or the sale, or
notifies the seller to proceed no further therewith, the buyer shall be
liable to the seller for no greater damages than the seller would have
suffered if he did nothing toward carrying out the contract or the sale
after receiving notice of the buyer's repudiation or countermand. The
profit the seller would have made if the contract or the sale had been
fully performed shall be considered in estimating such damages.
Subsections (1) and (2) clearly state the rules of the common
law
Subsection (3) states the rule of the common law, adding, how-
ever, specifically the cases in which the general rule laid down by
the subsection is not applicable. The cases cited under subsection
(3) in section 63, where the vendor was held to have elected to
have retained the goods apply this rule. The rule was also ap-
plied in Hughes v. Eastern R. & Lumber Co., 177 in which case
the court permitted the resale price to be taken into consideration
in estimating the market price. The court also suggests that
profits may be allowed where there is no market price. In Jones-
Scott Co. v. Ellensburg Milling Co., 781 the court m accordance
with the rule held that where no time is fixed the measure of
damages is the difference between the contract price and the mar
ket price at the date of the demand and refusal (citing cases)
Subsection (4) expresses the general doctrine of the common
1'7 93 Wash. 558, 562, 161 Pac. 343 (1916).
"'8 116 Wash. 266, 199 Pac. 238 (1921).
WASHINGTON SALES ACT
law in the United States. It Ends application in the case of
Peterson v. Lone Lake Lumber Co.,"'
See. 65. When Seller May Resc nd Contract or Sale.
Where the goods have not been delivered to the buyer, and the buyer
has repudiated the contract to sell or sale, or has manifested his Inability
to perform his obligations thereunder, or has committed a material
breach thereof, the seller may totally rescind the contract or the sale by
giving notice of his election so to do to the buyer.
This section represents the weight of authority in tins country
and is an application of contract law. For the seller to rescind
the contract for repudiation or a material breach the election must
be manifested. 80 This rule has been applied without question in
Washington. 8" Obviously, this remedy would be chosen in the
cases where the seller has suffered no damage.
REMEDIS OF T1E Buym.
Sec. 66. Action for Converting or Detaining Goods.
Where the property in the goods has passed to the buyer and the seller
wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer may main.
tam any action allowed by law to the owner of goods of similar kind
when wrongfully converted or withheld.
This section expresses the law of England as well as of this
country It allows trover, replevin, equitable or other relief, as
may be permitted under the local law.
See. 67 Action for Failing to Deliver Goods.
(1) Where the property in the goods has not passed to the buyer, and
the seller wrongfully neglects or refuses to deliver the goods, the buyer
may maintain an action against the seller for damages for non-delivery.
(2) The measure of damages is the loss directly and naturally result-
ing, in the ordinary course of events, from the seller's breach of contract.
(3) Where there is an available market for the goods in question, the
measure of damages, in the absence of special circumstances showing
proximate damages of a greater amount, is the difference between the
contract price and the market or current price of the goods, at the time
or times when they ought to have been delivered, or, if no time was fixed,
then at the time of the refusal to. deliver.
The buyer is here allowed rights against the seller on breach
1" 58 Wash. 72, 107 Pac. 857 (1910).
"o2 W L Is;o, CONTRACTS, 1469.
"'Meeker v. Johnson, 5 Wash. 718, 32 Pac. 772 (1893) Ness v. O'Brzen,
12 Wash. 358, 41 Pac. 59, 50 Am. St. Rep. 894 (1895) (seller allowed to
retain an advance payment).
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of contract which correspond to those of the seller against the
buyer under section 64, supra. Section 67 is merely declaratory
of the common law
Many cases in Washington are in accord with subsection (3) .182
See. 68. Specific Performance.
Where the seller has broken a contract to deliver specific or ascertained
goods, a court having the powers of a court of equity may, if it thinks
fit, on the application of the buyer, by its judgment or decree direct that
the contract shall be performed specifically, without giving the seller the
option of retaining the goods on payment of damages. The judgment or
decree may be unconditional, or upon such terms and conditions as to
damages, payment of the price and otherwise, as to the court may seem
just.
While this section does not enlarge or change the powers of the
equity court, it is hoped that it will lead to more freedom in the
granting of such relief. As Mr. Williston says :183
"Courts of equity have very closely restricted their
jurisdiction in regard to contracts for the sale of per-
sonal property It would sometimes promote justice if
the court were somewhat more ready to allow specific
performance of contracts to sell goods in cases where for
any reason damages did not seem adequate. This section
of the act will perhaps dispose courts to enlarge some-
what the number of cases where specific performance is
allowed. "
The cases in Washington have been limited to corporate stock
and based on the fundamental rule that the relief would be
allowed only when the remedy at law for damages would be in-
12 In support of the general rule see, Loewt v. Long, 76 Wash. 480,
136 Pac. 673 (1913) and Lilly v. Lilly, Bogardus & Co., 39 Wash. 337, 81
Pac. 852 (1905). Damages based on difference between contract price and
market price at time when goods ought to have been delivered, see Pearce
v. Puyallup & Sumner F G. C. Co., 117 Wash. 612, 201 Pac. 905 (1921).
Between contract price and market price at time of refusal to deliver*
Sussman v. Gustav 116 Wash. 275, 199 Pac. 232 (1921) Menz Lbr Co. v.
McNeely & Co., 58 Wash. 223, 108 Pac. 621 (1910) and Coast Fir Lbr
Co. v. Puget Sound M. & P Go., 117 Wash. 515, 201 Pac. 747 (1921)
For cases showing proximate damages of a greater amount than the gen-
eral rule,-allowed, see Schulze v. Buckeye Lbr Co., 94 Wash. 520, 162
Pac. 588 (1917) Keen v. Seanson, 129 Wash. 269, 224 Pac. 574 (1924)
Waldron Co. v. Beattie Mfg. Co., 113 Wash. 533, 194 Pac. 557 (1920)
Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911). Not
allowed, see Carolene Sales Co. v. Canyon Mills Prod. Co., 122 Wash. 220,
210 Pac. 366 (1922) Simmons & Co. v. Northwestern Junk Co., 124 Wash.
61, 213 Pac. 485 (1923).
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adequate. It was refused in the cases of Templeton v. Warner,184
and Gleason v. Earles.'8 5 It was allowed in Tri-State Term. Co. v.
Wash. Wheat G. Ass'n.,18 in which case Justice Main cites with
approval a note from 22 A.L.R. 1030, 1041, as follows.
"Generally speaking, where the corporate stock which
is the subject of a contract of sale of which specific per-
formance is sought is of unknown and of not easily ascer-
tainable value, or is unobtainable in the open market, it
has been held that a suit for the specific performance
thereof may be maintained, the remedy at law in such a
case being regarded as inadequate."
See. 69. Remedies for Breach of Warranty.
(1) Where there is a breach of warranty by the seller the buyer may,
at his election: (a) Accept or keep the goods and set up against the
seller the breach of warranty by way of recoupment in diminution or
extinction of the price; (b) Accept or keep the goods and maintain an
action against the seller for damages for the breach of warranty; (c) ,Re-
fuse to accept the goods, if the property therein has not passed, and
maintain an action against the seller for damages for the breach of war-
ranty; (d) Rescind the contract to sell or the sale and refuse to receive
the goods, or if the goods have already been received, return them or offer
to return them to the seller and recover the price or any part thereof
which has been paid.
(2) When the buyer has claimed and been granted a remedy in any one
of these ways, no other remedy can thereafter be granted.
(3) Where the goods have been delivered to the buyer, he can not
rescind the sale if he knew of the breach of warranty when he accepted
the goods, or if he fails to notify the seller within a reasonable time of
the election to rescind, or if he fails to return or to offer to return the
goods to the seller in substantially as good condition as they were in at
the time the property was transferred to the buyer. But if deterioration
or injury of the goods is due to the breach of warranty, such deterioration
or injury shall not prevent the buyer from returning or offering to return
the goods to the seller and rescinding the sale.
(4) Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so,
the buyer shall cease to be liable for the price upon returning or offering
to return the goods. If the price or any part thereof has already been
paid, the seller shall be liable to repay so much thereof as has been paid,
concurrently with the return of the goods, or immediately after an offer
to return the goods in exchange for repayment of the price.
(5) Where the buyer is entitled to rescind the sale and elects to do so,
if the seller refuses to accept an offer of the buyer to return the goods,
the buyer shall thereafter be deemed to hold the goods as bailee for the
1'189 Wash. 584, 154 Pac. 1081 (1916).
uSI78 Wash. 491, 139 Pac. 213 (1914).
18-134 Wash. 519, 236 Pac. 75 (1925).
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
seller, but subject to a lien to secure the repayment of any portion of the
price which has been paid, and with the remedies for the enforcement
of such lien allowed an unpaid seller by Section 53.
(6) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the loss directly
and naturally resulting, in the ordinary course of events, from the breach
of warranty.
(7) In the case of breach of warranty of quality, such loss, in the ab-
sence of special circumstances showing proximate damage of a greater
amount, is the difference between the value of the goods at the time of
delivery to the buyer and the value they would have had if they had
answered to the warranty.
This section differs materially from the English act, particularly
in so far as it relates to and permits rescission. It is in accord
with the common law in the majority of the American jurisdic-
tions. It should be observed that section 49, supra, qualifies sec-
tion 69 (1) (a) and (b)
The Washington cases are in accord with the rule of the section
and its subdivisions.
Subsection (1) (a) recoupment was permitted in Tacoma Coal
Co. v. Bradley,'"" and Huntingdon v. Lombard. s88  (b) The action
may be by counterclaim or by a separate proceeding brought by
the buyer. This is the usual relief in all cases except rescission
and therefore will include practically all the citations under this
section except those cases.'8 9  (c) The buyer may refuse the title
and sue for damages. 90 (d) The right of rescission for breach of
warranty after the title has passed has been a matter of conflict
of authority in the United States. In the early case of Baker &
Hamilton v. McAllister, 9 ' rescission was allowed for breach of
warranty as to title. In Hulet v. Achey,' 92 rescission was denied.
In Baker v. Robbns,1 3 the court distinguished the right of rescis-
shion in cases of fraud and warranty and, finally, in Klock v.
Newbury, 94 decided squarely that rescission could be had in cases
12 Wash. 600, 27 Pac. 454, 26 A.S.R. 890 (1891)
11122 Wash. 202, 73 Pac. 1128 (1900).
89Baker Mfg. Go. v. Hall, 104 Wash. 15, 175 Pac. 304 (1918) Dtckzn-
son Fire, etc. Brick Co. v. Crowe & Co., 63 Wash. 550, 115 Pac. 1087 (1911)
Buerkli 'v. Carstens Packing Co., 122 Wash. 458, 210 Pac. 798 (1922)
Peterson v. Denny-Renton C. & C. Co., 89 Wash. 147, 154 Pac. 123 (1916).
190 Sussman v. Mitsus & Co., 114 Wash. 295, 195 Pac. 3 (1921).
"1 2 Wash. Terr. 48, 3 Pac. 581 (1880).
11239 Wash. 91, 80 Pac. 1105 (1905).
93 51 Wash. 467, 99 Pac. 1 (1909).
"1 63 Wash. 153, 114 Pac. 1032 (1911)
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of warranty The later cases recognize this relief without ques-
ton.
Subsection (2) These remedies are exclusive."4 %
Subsection (3). It should be noted that if title has passed to the
buyer, that if he elects. to rescind, he can not hold the seller liable
in damages because the goods furnished do not fulfill the con-
tractual obligation. As an application of general contractual prin-
ciples this might have originally been open to qnestion, (see dis-
senting opinion by Justice Dunbar in Houser & Haines Mfg. Co. -v.
McKay'9 5) but the law is now well settled in accord with the sub-
section. Failure to notify has been deemed a waiver.""' The goods
must be returned in statu quo. 9 7 But deterioration does not nec-
essarily prevent the buyer from rescission. 198
Subsection (4) states the general rule where rescission is al-
lowed. 99
Subsection (5). This seems perfectly reasonable and without the
aid of the act was so held in Case Threshing Machine Co. V. Secott.
20 0
Subsection (6). This states the general rule.2 0'
Subsection (7) While there is some conflict of authority this
subsection expresses the weight of authority 202
Section 70. Interest and Special Damages.
Nothing in this act shall affect the right of the buyer or of the seller
to recover interest or special damages In any case where by law interest
or special damages may be recoverable, or to recover money paid where
the consideration for the payment of it has failed.
This is a question of damages and merely declares that the Sales
Act is not to affect the local rules.
% Houser & Haines Mfg. Co. v. McKay, 53 Wash. 337, 101 Pac. 894
(1909) Blake-Rutherford Farms Co. v. Holt Mfg. Co., 70 Wash. 192, 126
Pac. 418 (1912).
15Note 1941h, supra.
Noble v. Olympia Brewing Co., 64 Wash. 461, 117 Pac. 241 (1911).
" Burnley v. Shinn, 80 Wash. 240, 141 Pac. 326 (1914).
"' Noll v. Garford Motor Truck Co., 111 Wash. 650, 191 Pac. 828
(1920) Klock v. Newbury, note 193, supra.
10 Houser & Haines Mfg. Co. v. McKay, note 195, supra, Greenwood v.
lnternational Harvester Co., 122 Wash. 603, 211 Pac. 727 (1922).
096 Wash. 566, 165 Pac. 485 (1917).
: 'As to the recovery of consequential damages see Wapato Fruit &
Cold Storage Co. v. Denham, 126 Wash. 676, 219 Pac. 30 (1923) where not
allowed; and for cases where allowed, see Mullerlaile v. Brandt, 64 Wash.
280, 116 Pac. 868 (1911) and Hausken v. Hodson-Feenaughty Co., 109
Wash. 606, 187 Pac. 319 (1920)
2Walsh v. Meyer, 40 Wash. 650, 82 Pac. 938 (1905) Connor & Groger,
Inc. v. Forest Mills, Ltd., 108 Wash. 468, 184 Pac. 319 (1919).
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PART VI.
INTERPRETATION.
Sec. 71. Variation of Implied Obligatwns.
Where any right, duty or liability would arise under a contract to sell
or a sale by implication of law, it may be negatived or varied by express
agreement or by the course of dealing between the parties, or by custom,
if the custom be such as to bind both parties to the contract or the sale.
This states an obvious proposition of contract law. The follow-
ing sections, dealing with the interpretation of the act, require
little comment, as they are merely directory or explanatory
Sec. 72. Rights May Be Enforced by Action.
Where any right, duty or liability is declared by this act, it may, unless
otherwise by this act provided, be enforced by action.
Sec. 73. Rule for Cases Not Provided for by This Act.
In any case not provided for in this act, the rules of law and equity,
including the law merchant, and in particular the rules relating to the
law of principal and agent and to the effect of fraud, misrepresentation,
duress or coercion, mistake, bankruptcy or other invalidating cause, shall
continue to apply to contracts to sell and to sales of goods.
Sec. 74. Interpretaton Shall Give Effect to Purpose of Uni-
formity.
This act shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its gen-
eral purpose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact It.
This introduces a new principle of interpretation. Generally
when a part of the law is codified, the courts in their interpretation
have regard to the law as it existed prior to the passage of the
part codified. The reason for the provision in this section is
apparent when it is understood the purpose of the act is to secure
uniformity of the law in the several states.
See. 75. Provisons Not Applicable to Mortgages.
The provisions of this act relating to contracts to sell and to sales do
not apply, unless so stated, to any transaction in the form of a contract
to sell or a sale, which is intended to operate by way of mortgage, pledge,
charge or other security.
Reference should be made to sections 20 (2) and 22 (a) supra.
Sec. 76. Definitions.
(1) In this act, unless the context or subject matter otherwise requires:
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"Action" includes counterclaim, setoff and suit in equity.
"Buyer" means a person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal
successor In interest of such person.
"Defendant" includes a plaintiff against whom a right of setoff or
counterclaim is asserted.
"Delivery" means voluntary transfer of possession from one person to
another.
"Divisible contract to sell or sale" means a contract to sell or a sale in
which by its terms the price for a portion or portions of the goods less
than the whole Is fixed or ascertainable by computation.
"Document of title to goods" includes any bill of lading, dock warrant,
warehouse receipt or order for the delivery of goods, or any other docu-
ment used in the ordinary course of business In the sale or transfer of
goods, as proof of the possession or control of the goods, or authorizing
or purporting to authorize the possessor of the document to transfer or
receive, either by Indorsement or by delivery, goods represented by such
document.
"Fault" means wrongful act or default.
"Fungible Goods" means goods of which any unit Is from its nature or
by mercantile usage treated as the equivalent of any other unit.
"Future Goods" means goods to be manufactured or acquired by the
seller after the making of the contract of sale.
"Goods" includes all chattels personal other than things in action and
money. The term includes emblements, industrial growing crops, and
things attached to or forming part of the land which are agreed to be
severed before sale or under the contract of sale.
"Order" in sections of this act relating to documents of title means an
order by indorsement on the document.
"Person" includes a corporation or partnership or two or more persons
having a joint or common interest.
"Plaintiff" includes defendant asserting a right of setoff or counter-
claim.
"Property" means the general property in goods, and not merely a
special property.
"Purchaser" includes mortgagee and pledgee.
"Purchases" includes taking as a mortgagee or as a pledgee.
"Quality of goods" includes their state or condition.
"Sale" includes a bargain and sale as well as a sale and delivery.
"Seller" means a person who sells or agrees to sell goods, or any legal
successor in the interest of such person.
"Specific goods" means goods identified and agreed upon at the time
a contract to sell or a sale is made.
"Value" is any consideration sufficient to support a simple contract.
An antecedent or pre-existing claim, whether for money or not, consti-
tutes value where goods or documents of title are taken either in satisfac-
tion thereof or as security therefor.
(2) A thing Is done "in good faith" within the meaning of this act
when it is in fact done honestly, whether it be done negligently or not.
(3) A person is insolvent within the meaning of this act who either
has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business or cannot
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pay his debts as they become due, whether he has committed an act of
bankruptcy or not, and whether he is insolvent within the meaning of
the federal bankruptcy law or not.
(4) Goods are in a "deliverable state" within the meaning of this act
when they are in such a state that the buyer would, under the contract,
be bound to take delivery of them.
"In general the definitions in the Sales Act are not intended
to establish a rule of law but merely to define exactly the meaning
of words so that the terms in which rules of law are stated in
other sections of the Act may be perfectly definite. This is not
true, however, of the definition of 'value' in subsection (1) or of
the definitions of 'in good faith,' and 'insolvency,' in the subsec-
tions (2) and (3) These definitions in defining a word or phrase
virtually enact a rule of law "203
It should be noted that the term "goods" should not include
shares of stock, in which respect it should be distinguished from
section 4 of the Act relating to the Statute of Frauds, as there
"choses in action" are expressly included.
The word "value" defined in subsection (1) and used in such
a phrase as "purchaser for value," is the same as the definition
used in the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law Our court had
formerly held that taking property in payment of a pre-existing
debt in the case of chattels did not constitute the buyer a purchaser
for value.20 4 While there was some wavering in the decisions, the
court finally went on record in Long v. McAvoy,10 and after an
analysis of the various decisions, held that a transfer of property
in payment of pre-existing debt did make the buyer a purchaser
for value. This seems advisable, as it is confusing to have value
mean one thing in the law of negotiable instruments and another
in the transfer of chattel interests. In the last mentioned decision
Justice Bridges said
"In McLaughlin v. Dopps, 84 Wash. 442, and German-
Amercan Bank v. Wright, 85 Wash. 460, we held that
where the consideration for the purchase of a negotiable
instrument was the payment of a pre-existing debt, there
was a purchase in good faith and for value. These two
cases are based on our Negotiable Instruments Act and
should not be considered as controlling of the question
1 WILLISTON, SALES 619.
2" Woonsocket Rubber Co. v. Loewenberg Bros., 17 Wash. 29, 48 Pac.
785 (1897) Thomas v. G-rote-Rankrn Co., 75 Wash. 280, 134 Pao. 919
(1913).
1'133 Wash. 472, 233 Pac. 930, 236 Pac. 806 (1925)
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here. To hold here that a transfer of property in payment
of a pre-existing debt does not make the purchaser one for
value would be to bring great confusion into our cases."
"Following that whnch seems to us to be the most logical
rule and the one which. will more nearly lend itself to
business interests, and which will more completely har-
monize our own decisions on the subject, we hold that
one who purchases personal property of any character,
paying therefor by discharging a pre-existing debt, is a
purchaser for value, and that the appellant here was such
a purchaser."
In subsection (2) the definition of "good faith" is also the one
wnch is adopted in the law of negotiable instruments. Prior to
the adoption of the Act a purchaser was not one m good faith
who had knowledge of facts which would put a reasonable man
on inquiry, and such inquiry would have disclosed the truth.'0
The change again seems desirable for the reason that it tends to
avoid confusion, particularly since bills of lading and warehouse
receipts play such an important part in commercial transactions
and are by the Acts given negotiability
The definition in subsection (3) is the accepted meaning in the
law of contracts and sales and should be, as in the law of con-
tracts and sales the question is not whether a debtor's property
exceeds his debts, but whether he can and does pay his debts as
they mature.
See. 76-a. Act Does Not Apply to Extsting Sales or Contracts
to Sell.
None of the provisions of this act shall apply to any sale, or to any
contract to sell, made prior to the taking effect of this act.
See. 76-b. No Repeal of Certam Acts.
Nothing In this act shall be construed-to repeal, limit or modify any of
the provisions of the bulk sales act, being Section 5832 to 5836 inclusive
of Remington's Compiled Statutes, nor the uniform warehouse receipts
act, being sections 3587 to 3646 inclusive of Remington's Compiled Sta-
tutes, nor the uniform bills of lading act, being sections 3647 to 3701 in-
clusive of Remington's Compiled Statutes.
As the Uniform Warehouse Receipts Act does not give to such
instruments the same degree of negotiability as is given to docu-
ments of title in this Act, this section is necessary to avoid the
1ReedZ v. Loney, 22 Wash. 433, 61 Pac. 41 (1900).
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inference that certain sections of that Act dealing with negotia-
bility would be repealed. For a discussion, see section 32, supra.
See. 77 Repealed.
Section 5826 of Remington's Compiled Statutes is hereby repealed.
See. 78. Time When the Act Takes Effect.
This act shall take effect as provided by law.
See. 79. Name of Act.
This act may be cited as the "Uniform Sales Act."
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